Introduction
In Europe today there are concerns about a democratic deficit (i.e. that the European political institutions are not sufficiently responsive to the will of the European public). People worry that the Council of Ministers is not transparent enough in its decision-making, that the Commission is not sufficiently accountable to the European public, and that the only directly elected body of the European Union -the European Parliament -does not have sufficient influence in the legislative process. With the pending enlargement to the East, reforms of these bodies are being debated. Advocates hope that these reforms will both ensure that a substantial enlargement does not paralyze the ability of the European Union (EU) to function and decrease the (perceived) democratic deficit.
However, what is not on the negotiating table, but is just as important to the democratic functioning of the EU, is the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Without an independent judiciary capable of ensuring that not even powerful political actors are above the law, an important democratic check is missing. As such, the ability of the ECJ to rule against member state governments and get compliance with its decisions matters. This observation suggests two questions: (1) in what ways is the ECJ currently fulfilling that role; and (2) how might enlargement change this situation?
Prima facie evidence suggests that the ECJ is in fact quite powerful. It has legally integrated the EU through the Supremacy and Direct Effect doctrines, 1 promoted new levels of economic integration through aggressive use of precedent, 2 and facilitated compliance with existing EU law even when governments were in opposition. 3 However, although this evidence appears persuasive, it is ultimately inconclusive without arguments justifying why governments cannot unilaterally ignore court decisions or as a group rein in the court by treaty revision or secondary legislation. After all, the ECJ might engage in this behavior only when it knows it has the governments' tacit approval (Garrett, 1995; Garrett and Weingast, 1993; Garrett et al., 1998) .
The threat of treaty revisions and secondary legislation can be dismissed fairly easily. Although such actions can constrain ECJ behavior, they are difficult to take (Alter, 1996 (Alter, , 1998 (Alter, , 2001 Scharpf, 1988) . Treaty revision requires the unanimous consent of all member state governments, and secondary legislation requires at least a qualified majority. Thus, the threat of treaty revisions or secondary legislation alone would not prevent the ECJ from influencing the pace and direction of integration.
The threat of unilateral noncompliance is much more serious since it does not require coordinated action. If governments can freely ignore the ECJ, it is improbable that the ECJ could expect compliance with decisions that were not at least tacitly acceptable to those governments.
Given these observations, for the ECJ to be a true democratic check in the EU there must exist some exogenous constraint ensuring that governments cannot unilaterally ignore an undesirable ruling. However, where might such a constraint come from, under what conditions would it bind governments, and should we believe it holds today? Possible explanations have been proposed by Slaughter (1995, 1998) , Alter (1996 Alter ( , 1998 Alter ( , 2001 , and Pollack (1997) . However, as will be demonstrated subsequently, none of these arguments is complete by itself. Thus, in this article I propose an alternative explanation, which applies a previously derived theory of endogenous judicial development (Carrubba, 2002b) to the study of the ECJ. Using this theory, I can explain how a court can evolve from one that is entirely dependent upon voluntary governmental compliance to one that can act as if governments are constrained to obey its rulings. Critical to this story is an assumption that there is some cost to a government from ignoring a court ruling. For expositional purposes this cost is referred to as a 'legitimacy cost. ' The rest of the article proceeds in five parts. First I provide background and a literature review. The primary purpose is to present the existing debate on the role of the ECJ and place this study within that context. Then I derive the basic government-court model. I start by identifying when government and court preferences are in conflict. This step is critical: without such a conflict governments would voluntarily obey any adverse court ruling, thereby making it impossible to evaluate when governments find themselves constrained. Once preferences are defined, the section continues by specifying a baseline version of the legal game being played. In particular, this part derives how governments and the court behave if there are no legitimacy costs. Interestingly, even without legitimacy costs a court can still act as a partial check on the actions of political actors. The next section generalizes the model by allowing for the possibility of legitimacy costs, derives the conditions under which these costs arise, and demonstrates when they are constraining. Finally, I discuss the implications of these findings for the role of the ECJ as an important institutional check in a democratic system and how that role might be affected by enlargement.
into two phases, an early, highly conflictual one, and a later, more reconciliatory one.
The conflictual phase was characterized by two positions, one rooted in an intergovernmental approach and the other rooted in a neo-functional approach. The intergovernmental perspective, framed by Garrett (1995) and Garrett and Weingast (1993) , believed that the ECJ helped facilitate integration, but only to the degree that member state governments desired it. They took this position because (1) governments would not want to accept ECJ rulings when the benefits were outweighed by the costs and (2) the court had no direct enforcement mechanism to make governments comply under those conditions.
The more neo-functional position was framed by a number of scholars (Alter, 1996 (Alter, , 1998 Burley and Mattli, 1993; Cappelletti et al., 1986; Golub, 1996; Mancini, 1991; Mattli and Slaughter, 1995; Rasmussen, 1986; Stein, 1981; Volcansek, 1993; Weiler, 1981 Weiler, , 1991 Weiler, , 1993 Weiler, , 1994 and Wincott, 1995) . These scholars believe not only that governments are constrained to obey ECJ rulings, but that the ECJ is exercising this power all the time. Thus, they believe that the ECJ has promoted integration far beyond what the member state governments might have desired. 4 Two main arguments have been proposed to explain why governments are constrained to obey the ECJ. First, Mattli and Slaughter argue that ECJ decisions have been protected by the 'mask and shield' of the law (Burley and Mattli, 1993; Mattli and Slaughter, 1995) . According to these scholars, the use of technical, legal discourse 'masked' the political ramifications of ECJ decisions from governments, and the existence of 'domestic norms of rule of law and judicial independence' 'shielded' the ECJ decisions from noncompliance. Thus, the legal context allowed the ECJ the leeway to make rulings and establish doctrines that governments would otherwise prevent.
Second, Alter (1996 Alter ( , 1998 Alter ( , 2001 argues that ECJ influence arose from the co-opting of national courts. As the Supremacy and Direct Effect doctrines became accepted, governments were no longer choosing whether to obey the ECJ, but rather whether to obey their national courts. And, whereas it might be relatively costless to ignore the ECJ, the same is not true of domestic rulings.
At this point in the debate there seemed to be no common ground. One group of scholars saw the ECJ fundamentally as a tool of the member state governments, whereas the other group saw the ECJ as an important, independent force. At heart, the disagreement was over enforcement mechanisms. Garrett (1995) and Garrett and Weingast (1993) argued that governments could always unilaterally ignore ECJ rulings, whereas Burley and Mattli (1993) , Mattli and Slaughter (1995) , Alter (1996 Alter ( , 1998 , and others argued the opposite. However, as polarized as this phase of the debate was, scholars on both sides significantly changed their positions in later work.
In a 1998 piece by Garrett, Kelemen, and Schulz, Garrett allowed for the possibility that issues such as precedent in court rulings could make it costly simply to ignore a court ruling. Thus, they conceded that under some conditions governments might comply with court rulings that they would prefer to ignore. Then, in 2001, Garrett went even further, publishing a theory of integration (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001 ) that completely assumed away the ability of governments unilaterally to ignore court rulings. In contrast, Alter (2001) and Mattli and Slaughter (1998) , based upon work by Pollack (1997) , conceded that national court rulings could unilaterally be ignored. However, they argued that governments would pay a cost for ignoring rulings because doing so would undermine the legitimacy of the legal regime. Thus, EU law could be enforced against the wishes of member state governments only as long as the cost of ignoring the ruling was sufficiently large.
From this convergence, should we conclude that governments are constrained to obey ECJ rulings and thus that the ECJ is an effective democratic check on the behavior of member state governments? Neither of Garrett's articles makes a persuasive case to that effect. Tsebelis and Garrett (2001) assume away unilateral noncompliance without explanation, and there is substantial evidence in other literatures that precedent is not a constraint in judicial decision-making Spaeth, 1996a, 1996b ; but see Knight and Epstein, 1996) .
Mattli and Slaughter's claim that the law acts as a mask and shield for judicial decisions (Burley and Mattli, 1993; Mattli and Slaughter, 1995) fares little better. First, to assume that law 'masks' the political ramifications of a decision is to suggest that governments are incapable of evaluating what outcome would serve their purposes best. Since governments make observations on ECJ cases on a regular basis, it seems demonstrably implausible that the governments do not have well-formed preferences over outcomes. Further, to say that the legal venue 'shields' decisions from political interference, owing to the domestic norms of the rule of law, is to assume that governments will obey court rulings because governments have been observed doing so in the past. There are a number of reasons why governments may obey court rulings in one situation and not in another. This point is demonstrated throughout this article. Thus, Mattli and Slaughter's argument does not convincingly eliminate the threat of unilateral noncompliance.
Pollack's argument is the most promising by far. Governments clearly can ignore national court rulings, just as they can ignore ECJ rulings, but there may well be some potential cost to governments for being seen to undermine the legitimacy of the legal system. And, if this cost is sufficiently large, governments would choose to obey the ruling even if they would prefer not to.
However, although the existence of a legitimacy cost is plausible, none of the scholars relying on Pollack's (1997) work does more than assume that such a cost exists. Thus, a number of important questions remain. How large must the legitimacy cost be to result in compliance? What factors influence the answer to this question? Do those factors vary by country, and thus are some governments more likely to be constrained than others? And how might enlargement change things? Additionally, from where do these legitimacy costs arise? Pollack and others assume governments will experience them because national courts make the rulings. However, it is problematic simply to assume legitimacy costs, for two reasons. First, not all national courts are created equal. Some courts are perceived to have more legitimacy than others and EU law is considered more sacrosanct in some countries than in others. Thus, it is unclear whether the conditions exist in all of these countries such that a government would be punished for ignoring a national court ruling on EU law. Second, almost half of the ECJ rulings are now made directly, without recourse to national courts. Thus, if a government is going to pay some cost from not complying with a legal decision, roughly half of the time it is doing so because there is a cost from ignoring an ECJ decision, not just from ignoring a national court decision.
In sum, we cannot and should not simply assume the existence of legitimacy costs. Rather, I would like to derive the conditions under which a government will experience them and, from there, evaluate the likelihood that those costs exist.
Conceptualizing conflict between the court and member state governments
Identifying when legitimacy costs cause governments to obey adverse court rulings first requires determining when government and court preferences are in conflict. And determining when their preferences are in conflict first requires establishing what governments and the ECJ are making choices over as well as their preferences over those choices.
EU policy domains, government preferences, and the role of the court
At its core, the EU has been and remains a set of institutions designed to facilitate cooperation in trade and trade-related issues (Garrett, 1995) . This policy area is commonly characterized as a prisoner's dilemma for governments. If every country eliminated its tariff and non-tariff barriers, each would experience increased economic growth from better access to foreign markets and more efficient allocation of its own resources (i.e. free trade regimes are mutually beneficial). However, because this growth comes at the expense of businesses in previously protected sectors having to adapt to the newly competitive environment, governments find it politically costly to lower their own trade barriers. Thus, a government gains some fixed benefit, B, from another government agreeing to lower barriers and pays some cost, c, from agreeing to lower its own barriers, and both governments are better off if both lower barriers, B -c > 0.
The problem for the member state governments is that this situation creates an incentive to defect unilaterally from the free trade regime. Once the laws are on the books, each government would be strictly better off if it reimposed its own trade barriers in violation of the agreement. The violating government would gain the benefit of other member states lowering their barriers while simultaneously not paying the cost of lowering its own.
One way of discouraging such behavior is the threat of retaliation. If a government can impose a sufficiently large cost on the potential defector by re-establishing its own trade barriers, defection can be deterred. However, whether retaliation would be costly enough to deter noncompliance depends upon a number of factors, including how highly governments value the future and how likely they are to get caught defecting (Carrubba, 2002a) .
By monitoring noncompliance, the ECJ can reduce the probability that a defection goes unobserved, and thereby facilitate cooperation with EU law. However, although the governments can mold the institutional environment in which the ECJ operates, they cannot perfectly control court behavior. Thus, a classic principal-agent problem is created. ECJ preferences over the application of EU law may differ from those of the member state governments, and therefore the court may choose to follow its own preferences in applying EU law.
Since I want to identify the conditions under which legitimacy costs promote compliance with ECJ rulings, I am interested in modeling a situation in which the ECJ at least occasionally wants compliance with EU law when the governments do not. When does this hold? If, as stated above, universal compliance with the free trade regime is mutually beneficial, then by definition it is in the governments' interests to maintain compliance. Each government might want to impose trade barriers unilaterally, but all of the governments in expectation want a regime in which defections do not happen. Thus, governments would want the ECJ to rule against them and facilitate mutual compliance.
By implication, for conflict between the member state governments and the ECJ to exist, there must be times when compliance is mutually costly and
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governments would rather allow each other to defect. This condition holds if governments pay more for complying with EU law than they gain from having the other governments comply. In order to model this situation, allow the cost of compliance to take on one of two values, a low-cost value c l < B or a high-cost value c h > B. The next subsection formally characterizes the game that the governments and the ECJ are playing.
The government-court model Figure 1 illustrates the stage game for an infinitely repeated game. There are two parts to the stage game: the intergovernmental phase and the legal phase.
The intergovernmental phase starts with the governments randomly drawing a low cost with probability p and a high cost with probability 1 -p. Once nature determines the costs for that period, governments privately observe their draws and simultaneously choose whether to comply or not. Note that, unlike the typical prisoner's dilemma, the national governments do not observe each other's decisions directly. Instead there is a noisy signal that sometimes accurately reflects noncompliance and sometimes does not. Formally, there is some probability, p fd , with which a government that did comply is perceived as having not complied.
If compliance is observed, the legal phase is not entered into and the next period begins. However, if there is apparent noncompliance, the legal phase is entered.
The legal phase starts with the decision over whether there will be a case. In the model on which this analysis is based, this decision is made by the court. Without any prior knowledge of the nature of the case, the court probabilistically chooses whether to hear the case and pays some small cost in terms of time and resource constraints if it does. However, what is critical in this step is not that the court can choose whether to hear a case, but rather that cases arise probabilistically. Thus, there are two ways of conceptually transposing this feature of the model into the ECJ setting.
The first option is to transpose it directly by imagining that the ECJ probabilistically takes cases. This approach can be justified by the fact that the ECJ has the power explicitly to refuse to accept a reference, to 'orchestrate' the referral process by inducing national courts to refer cases selectively, and to re-frame the question the national court is asking (Chalmers, 1998: 450) .
The second option is to imagine that noncompliance would adversely affect some private interest. This private interest observes the noisy signal and from that observation chooses whether to bring a case. If it does bring the case, the private interest pays some small cost from engaging in litigation. Winning the case yields some benefit; losing the case yields nothing.
These two alternatives are observationally equivalent. Thus, all of the following analysis holds under either interpretation of the model. For ease of exposition, the rest of the discussion will assume litigants are bringing cases.
If a case is heard, the defendant's actual behavior as well as its cost of compliance become common knowledge. The court then decides whether to rule against the defending government or not. If the member state government is ruled against, the ECJ assigns a judgment ( Ji = j + ci for j > 0 and i = l,h), which implies a cost the court deems appropriate (financial and/or political) that the government must pay if it is to be seen as complying with the ECJ's ruling. Once any judgments (that are going to be paid) have been paid, the stage game ends.
Note that, by using this model, no distinction is drawn between the ECJ and national courts ruling on EU law. In effect, the model assumes that the EU legal system is a unitary actor. Or, put differently, this model assumes national courts want to rule the same way as the ECJ in whatever preliminary ruling cases arise. This simplification does not affect the analytic results. Allowing the national courts to have probabilistically divergent preferences from the ECJ would make the analytic solution somewhat more complex, but would not change any of the substantive findings. See Alter (1996 Alter ( , 1998 Alter ( , 2001 for treatment of the relationship between national courts and the EU legal system. For the rest of this article, national courts are explicitly referred to when the distinction between national courts and the ECJ is relevant.
Bodies acting in a vacuum
Assume for the moment that the model just characterized is the whole story. As with any infinitely repeated game, the folk theorem tells us that there is a multiplicity of equilibria. Below, I present what I believe to be the most plausible set of equilibria by characterizing first a category of punishment strategies and then the resulting on-equilibrium path behavior.
Punishment path behavior
Governments want to promote selective compliance. That is, governments want to promote compliance when the costs of compliance are low but not when they are high. As a result, governments want to punish each other if and only if they believe the other government has not complied over a lowcost situation. Further, because there must be some incentive for cases to be brought to court, governments want to make punishment conditional on whether or not court rulings are complied with. 5 In sum, a government is punished -by having to comply for some number of periods while the other government does not comply -if and only if the government is taken to court, is observed having drawn a low cost, is ruled against, and does not pay the judgment. 6
On-equilibrium path behavior
Governments comply with adverse decisions when costs are low but not when costs are high. The court rules against governments when costs are low but is indifferent on ruling against governments when costs are high. Cases are brought probabilistically against governments, and governments comply probabilistically over low costs only. Governments will comply only when caught defecting on a low cost because that is the only situation in which the government has to fear retribution for not following the court ruling. The ECJ wants to rule against governments only when costs are low because that is the only situation in which compliance occurs. Litigants bring cases probabilistically because the government is making litigants indifferent by not complying over low costs probabilistically. Governments comply over low costs probabilistically because the litigants make governments indifferent by bringing cases probabilistically. 7 Table 1 summarizes the on-equilibrium path conditions (see Carrubba, 2002b, for proofs) .
Implications
This baseline model without legitimacy costs has two relevant implications for the role of the ECJ in the European Union. First, if this equilibrium characterizes the whole story between the ECJ and the governments, the only reason we see compliance with EU law is because: (1) governments want some level of compliance; and (2) the ECJ anticipates when governments are willing to punish each other for noncompliance and rules accordingly. Thus, as Garrett (1995) states, observing high levels of compliance with ECJ rulings does not necessarily imply that ECJ rulings are binding upon national governments.
Carrubba The European Court of Justice, Democracy, and Enlargement 8 5 Second, although in this equilibrium the ECJ is solely a tool of the member state governments, the ECJ is still doing something. It is promoting compliance with EU law by issuing rulings where compliance otherwise would not exist. Thus, in this model the ECJ is still at least partially fulfilling the role of a democratic check on the behavior of national governments (these two findings are summarized as implication 1).
Implication 1: Without legitimacy costs, the ECJ can facilitate compliance with the EU legal regime but cannot enforce compliance against the wishes of the member state governments.
Is someone watching and should we care?
This first step in the analysis shows us that courts cannot rule against governments and get compliance without the tacit cooperation of the member state governments if there is no cost for ignoring court rulings. The next step is to allow for the possibility of a 'legitimacy cost' being imposed on governments for ignoring court rulings and seeing what happens. But from where does this cost arise? If the governments and the court are truly acting in a vacuum, there is no actor both interested in and capable of imposing such costs.
Every day journalists research and write articles of public interest. Some portion of the cases over EU law will merit attention and, of those, some portion are read by the European public. Thus, although the European public will be far from perfectly informed, we can reasonably expect that the governments and courts are not acting in a perfect vacuum. As the following discussion will illustrate, a minimally interested and informed public can be more than sufficient to completely change the dynamics between the governments and the court. Not only can the court issue rulings against governments over high costs and have those governments obey the rulings, but a court initially incapable of issuing these sort of 'binding' rulings can evolve into one that can, and it can do so with governments that are both aware of what is happening and capable of stopping it at any point. 8 The first step in demonstrating these claims is to model the role of the public explicitly. Assume the public is uncertain over three things: the game being played between the governments and the court, the preferences of the governments, and the preferences of the court.
Uncertainty over the game. The public believes the governments and the court are playing one of two games. Either they are playing the game described above where the only cost to disobeying a court ruling is the potential retaliation by other governments, or they are playing a game in which governments are 'supposed' to obey court rulings independently of the cost. Since it is always physically possible for a government not to comply with a ruling, the two games differ in that, in the second game, the government would pay some 'large' fixed cost for not obeying a court ruling. For ease of exposition label the first game one in which court rulings are 'not binding' and the second game one in which court rulings are supposed to be 'binding.'
Why are these the two options? As demonstrated earlier, there is little agreement over what we can learn from ECJ case law. Does it or does it not indicate that the ECJ is promoting integration and is therefore, in some sense, binding? If foremost experts on the subject are uncertain, it is unlikely that the public at large should be any less uncertain.
Uncertainty over the government. The public also believes there are two possible types of government, a 'desirable' type and an 'undesirable' type. Which type the government is depends on the relative costliness of the highcost situation. The undesirable type finds high-cost situations too costly ever to be willing to pay. In particular, the undesirable type will not comply over high costs even when court rulings are supposed to be binding. The desirable type does not find high-cost situations that costly.
Why are these two types labeled desirable and undesirable? Intuitively, the undesirable type is willing to break the 'rules of the game' when this serves its purposes. The desirable type is the opposite. For example, the Reagan administration might be considered undesirable because it violated the law in the Iran-Contra scandal.
Uncertainty over the court. The public believes there are two possible types of court, a 'strategic' type and a 'legal' type. The strategic type is interested only in maximizing instances of compliance over time, either ex ante, in terms of governments not defecting in the first place, or ex post, in terms of governments obeying adverse rulings if caught in noncompliance. The legal type also cares about making the 'correct' ruling. That is, the legal type wants to rule against a government if it is found in noncompliance even if the government is not going to obey the ruling. Assume the legal type cares enough about making the 'correct' ruling that it will do so even if this leads to less compliance in the future.
The public cares only about what type of government it has. I assume the public does not care about the outcome of any particular case, whether court rulings are supposed to be binding, or whether the court is being strategic in its rulings or not. This characterization is consistent with the existing evidence Gibson, 1995, 1997; Caldeira, 1995, 1998) . However, note that the public could have preferences over the actual outcomes of the cases and all of the findings would still hold.
Although the public does not take a direct interest in what the court is doing, the public can use what it observes to update its beliefs about whether it likes its government. In particular, assume the public gets to observe three events -whether its government is taken to court, whether its government is ruled against, and whether its government obeys the ruling. These are the events that the public could learn about from reading a newspaper article on cases involving EU law.
If the public decides it is sufficiently likely that its government is an undesirable type, the public will impose a cost on its government at the end of the period. Otherwise the public simply updates its beliefs and the next period starts. Table 2 summarizes the attributes of the model over which the public is uncertain, as well as the information the public uses to update.
With this structure in place, it is now possible to describe both the conditions under which governments will be constrained to obey court rulings and how a court can evolve from not being able to issue binding rulings to being able to do so. These subjects are considered in turn.
A legally integrated European Union
In equilibrium, governments are going to be constrained to obey court rulings only when the public is willing to punish its government for not paying an adverse judgment. Further, the public is only going to punish its government for an unpaid judgment if one more suspect action by the government causes the public to believe it is 'sufficiently likely' that its government is an undesirable type. If we assume this condition holds, as long as the cost the public can impose upon the government is sufficiently large, the court can rule against governments in high-cost situations and the governments will obey the ruling. 
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On-equilibrium path behavior
Assuming an unpaid judgment will signal to the public that its government is an undesirable type, the following behavior holds: the governments comply with adverse rulings independently of the cost of compliance; the court rules against governments independently of the cost of compliance; cases are brought probabilistically against governments; and, finally, governments always comply when costs are low and comply probabilistically when costs are high. 9 First, governments comply when ruled against because the government would rather pay the judgment than be punished by the public. Second, the court now rules against instances of high-cost noncompliance as well because it knows the government will obey the ruling. Third, litigants bring cases probabilistically because the government is making litigants indifferent by not complying over high costs probabilistically. Finally, governments comply over high costs probabilistically because the litigants make governments indifferent by bringing cases probabilistically. 10 Table 3 summarizes the onequilibrium path conditions (see Carrubba, 2002b, for proofs) .
Implications
This scenario describes an EU in which the legal system has in effect become an integrated, exogenous constraint on the member state governments. If a government ever disobeys the law and is caught doing so, that government will obey an adverse judgment. And the reason the government will obey is not because governments do not understand what is happening to them, or that governments could not physically disobey the rulings if they chose, but rather because there is a 'legitimacy cost' to being seen to disobey the court ruling.
This result allows us to answer the first question posited in the literature section: When is this legitimacy cost likely to be large enough to constrain governments? To answer this question, start by recalling that governments comply when ruled against only if they would rather pay the judgment than Carrubba The European Court of Justice, Democracy, and Enlargement 8 9 Table 3 On-equilibrium path behavior with legitimacy costs Condition 1. Governments pay judgments if the judgment is sufficiently small 2. Courts set judgments sufficiently small 3. Courts rule against governments if a government is caught in noncompliance 4. Cases are brought against governments probabilistically 5. Governments comply over high costs probabilistically and always comply over low costs be punished by the public. Inherent in this decision is a non-trivial calculation. If the government decides to pay, it implicitly concedes that it will pay these judgments in the future as well. Thus, by deciding to pay the judgment today, the government accepts that it will comply over high costs subsequently. Conversely, if the government decides not to pay the judgment and instead incur the public's wrath, it makes the opposite calculation. The government decides that it will not comply over high costs now or in the future. Thus, it actually chooses between paying the judgment today and accepting that it will comply over high costs, or being punished by the public but not accepting that it will comply over high costs. Given this result, we can better evaluate what must hold for legitimacy costs to constrain government behavior. The more frequently governments experience high costs and the more costly high-cost situations are, the more severe the public's punishment must be for governments to be constrained (implication 2 restates this finding).
Implication 2:
The more frequently the government expects to experience high costs and the more costly high-cost situations are, the more severe the public's punishment must be for the government to choose to comply.
Interestingly, a large legitimacy cost does not guarantee compliance with court rulings. Two additional conditions must hold as well.
First, the public must be sufficiently suspicious of its government in order to be willing to punish the government. Thus, we should expect that governments in more domestic trouble are more likely to choose to follow 'controversial' court rulings. For example, if the German Christian Democrats' recent financial scandal had surfaced while they were still in office, we would expect that the Kohl government would have been more hesitant to be seen directly disobeying a court ruling. Intuitively, the government would worry that it would look like the type of government willing to do anything to get its way, willing to go as far as breaking the law and disobeying the institutional rules of the game (this finding is restated in implication 3).
Implication 3:
If the public is not sufficiently suspicious of its government's behavior, governments will have a free hand to ignore adverse rulings on EU law independently of how costly the legitimacy costs may be.
Second, while not explicitly stated above, it is actually very important that the public thinks the court is a strategic type. Or, more precisely, it is important that the public thinks it is sufficiently likely that the court is a strategic type. Why? The public must believe that a disobeyed ruling is a signal that the government is an undesirable type. However, there are actually two scenarios under which disobeyed rulings can occur and only one of them clearly signals an undesirable-type government. In the scenario already described, a ruling is disobeyed because court rulings are supposed to be binding, the court ruled against an undesirable government in a high-cost situation, and the government refused to obey. In the alternative scenario, a ruling is disobeyed because court rulings are not supposed to be binding, a legal-type court ruled against a government in a high-cost situation, and the government ignored the ruling. The higher the probability that the court is a legal type, the more likely it is the government disobeyed the ruling because the court should not have ruled against it, and therefore the less likely is the public to punish the government. Thus, paradoxically, the public must actually believe the court is not ruling 'legalistically' for the court to be able to promote integration against the interests of the governments (this finding is restated in implication 4).
Implication 4:
If the public does not believe it is sufficiently likely that the court is a strategic type, governments will have a free hand to ignore adverse rulings on EU law independently of how costly the legitimacy costs may be.
These conclusions all hold whether the case was decided as a direct reference or as preliminary reference. Either way, the government is assessing whether the threat of the public's punishment is sufficient to cause it to want to comply with an adverse ruling and the public is assessing the government's motives for not following the court ruling. And, although national court rulings are obviously supposed to be binding in general, it is always possible that a national court can exceed its jurisdiction. For example, the US Supreme Court's decision on the 2001 US presidential election was seen by many as exceeding its appropriate authority.
How do you get there?
The previous section derived the conditions under which a legitimacy cost would constrain governments to obey adverse court rulings. These conditions rested critically on the assumption that the public would interpret an unpaid judgment as a signal that its government is an 'undesirable' type. This section derives the conditions under which those beliefs arise, and thereby the conditions under which a court can evolve into a 'binding' institution. For expositional purposes, I call the previous equilibrium the 'universal compliance phase' and this equilibrium the 'selective compliance phase.'
On-equilibrium path behavior
Start by assuming the public will not punish its government for an unpaid judgment because the public does not yet consider it 'sufficiently likely' that its government is an undesirable type. Observed behavior returns to the selective compliance equilibrium defined in the baseline model. Governments comply with adverse decisions if and only if costs are low, the court rules against governments if and only if costs are low, cases are brought against governments with a probability that makes governments indifferent over complying when costs are low, and governments comply when costs are low with a probability that makes litigants indifferent over bringing cases against governments. See Carrubba (2002b) for proofs.
Will this equilibrium phase make the transition into the universal compliance phase? The answer depends upon whether the public's perceptions change from considering it not to be 'sufficiently likely' that its government is an undesirable type to believing that it is sufficiently likely. Thus, explaining how the ECJ can evolve from a court that can rule only at the behest of member state governments into one that can rule against those same governments with impunity requires defining what constitutes 'sufficiently likely. ' As stated previously, the public updates its beliefs over three possible events: a government not being ruled against, a government being ruled against and obeying the ruling, and a government being ruled against and disobeying the ruling. The first two events influence the public's belief over whether court rulings are binding. If a government obeys a ruling, the public believes it is more likely that court rulings are supposed to be binding. If a government is not ruled against, it believes it is less likely that court rulings are supposed to be binding. Intuitively, the public is interpreting events as follows: if it keeps seeing its government obeying court rulings, it must be likely that court rulings are binding; if it keep seeing its government not being ruled against, it must be because the court cannot make governments obey its rulings.
The last event -a government ignoring an adverse ruling -signals either that the court is a legal type or that the government is an undesirable type. Observing this signal before entering the universal compliance phase indicates that the court is a legal type and observing this signal after entering the universal compliance phase indicates that the government is an undesirable type. Again, intuitively the pubic is interpreting events as follows: if it sees an unpaid judgment when it thinks its government is a desirable type, this is probably because the court is ruling against the government when it should not be; whereas if it sees an unpaid judgment when it thinks its government is an undesirable type, this is probably because its government did not comply when it should have. Note that observing an unpaid judgment before entering the universal compliance phase ensures that the public will never punish its government for noncompliance and thereby locks in the selective compliance phase for posterity (see Carrubba, 2002b, for proof) .
In equilibrium, only the first two events are observed. Governments will comply with ECJ rulings when they are caught defecting on a low cost and the ECJ will not rule against governments if it catches a high-cost or false defection. Thus, what changes from period to period is the public's belief about whether court rulings are supposed to be binding. This updating determines whether the public believes it is sufficiently likely that the government is an undesirable type to punish it for an unpaid judgment. Because a disobeyed ruling is a signal of an undesirable government only if court rulings are supposed to be binding, the higher the assessed probability that court rulings are supposed to be binding, the more likely it is that the public will punish its government for an unpaid judgment.
So, how does the public get to a point where it thinks the probability that court rulings are binding is large enough to punish a government for disobeying a ruling? Simply put, if the public observes a high enough proportion of cases in which its government is complying with adverse rulings, the public's belief that court rulings are supposed to be binding will be sufficiently strengthened to cause the public (to want) to punish a government if it observes an unpaid judgment.
One last point about this equilibrium is worth making. If a disobeyed ruling could stop this transition, and governments do not want this transition, why does a government not disobey an adverse ruling? Simply put, if the conditions for the equilibrium hold, the governments do not want to prevent the possibility of a transition.
Until the universal compliance phase is entered, the court rules against governments only upon observing a low-cost violation. Thus, if a government does not obey a ruling, the other governments will punish the transgressor. Assuming the threatened punishment is sufficiently large, the government rationally chooses to pay the judgment.
Why would the other governments choose to punish an unpaid judgment when they know that not punishing even once means there is no risk of making the transition to universal compliance? Simply put, because punishment comes after the judgment is left unpaid, there is no way for the governments credibly to commit to not punishing.
Implications
This analysis answers the question of how legitimacy costs arise. As governments obey adverse ECJ rulings, the public increasingly comes to believe that ECJ rulings are supposed to be followed. Eventually, even an uninterested and relatively ill-informed public can come to believe that governments should comply with ECJ rulings. From then on, assuming the public can impose a sufficiently large cost, governments will find themselves constrained to obey ECJ rulings. This result is important because: (1) legitimacy costs can arise on direct reference cases; and (2) one no longer has simply to assume that governments will pay a cost for ignoring a national court ruling on preliminary reference cases (this result is summarized in implication 5).
Implication 5: The ECJ can evolve from a court that cannot issue binding rulings to one that can issue binding rulings because legitimacy costs from ignoring court rulings can arise endogenously.
What is particularly nice about this finding is that there is no need to assume that the law acts as a 'mask and shield' for ECJ decisions. Not only can member state governments know exactly what the consequences of obeying a court ruling might be, but governments can even freely ignore court rulings at any time to foil the court's designs and this transition can still occur (this finding is summarized in implication 6).
Implication 6: Governments can be fully aware of and capable of stopping a transition to a universal compliance regime, and such a transition can still take place.
Of course, although legitimacy costs can arise, this analysis suggests that not all governments would necessarily pay a price for ignoring an ECJ ruling. Whether a country's public will punish its government for ignoring an ECJ ruling depends upon three subjective beliefs, which can vary by country: (1) whether the government is 'desirable'; (2) whether the court is 'strategic'; and (3) whether court rulings are 'supposed' to be binding. Thus, it may well be a mistake to generalize about what the ECJ can do across the various member states (this finding is implication 7).
Implication 7: Whether a government would pay a cost for ignoring an ECJ ruling may depend upon that government's nationality.
In fact, there is no guarantee that the ECJ will ever evolve into a court that can freely rule against governments and expect compliance. The transition occurs only if a high enough proportion of cases in which governments comply with adverse rulings (i.e. low-cost situations) arises over time (this finding is summarized as implication 8).
Implication 8: There is no guarantee that the ECJ will ever become a binding institution in any of the member states.
The European Court of Justice: democracy and enlargement
Democracy
The above analysis suggests that the EU legal system can act as a true democratic check on the member state governments only if the European public is willing to support the legal system against its domestic governments when the two disagree. This is important with regard to both preliminary rulings by domestic courts and direct rulings by the ECJ itself. Without the threat of public sanctions, the only incentive for governments to obey EU law is the threat of retaliation by other member state governments.
But does this threat of public sanctions exist? Alter (1996 Alter ( , 1998 Alter ( , 2001 ), Mattli, Slaughter (Burley and Mattli, 1993; Mattli and Slaughter, 1995) , and Pollack (1997) , among others, believe it does, at least at the national court level. Although at present there is no evidence to suggest how the public would respond to a government ignoring a national court ruling on EU law, there is evidence at the EU level that the ECJ has little store of legitimacy. Using survey research, Caldeira and Gibson Gibson, 1995, 1997; Caldeira, 1995, 1998) find that the European public does not consider the ECJ a particularly 'legitimate' institution. In particular they find that members of the European public would tend to support their national government if their government ignored an ECJ ruling that was perceived as costly to that country. Although the public would certainly be more likely to support a national court over its government, this finding does not bode well for the prospect that a government would pay a substantial cost for ignoring adverse rulings on EU law. Thus, this analysis, combined with existing empirical work, suggests that we should be cautious about concluding that the ECJ is a true democratic check on member state governments yet.
Even if the EU legal system is not yet a check on member state governments today, what are its prospects for the future? The points raised in earlier implications sections directly speak to this issue. First, this analysis shows that the EU legal system could evolve into a true democratic check with little outside help. Governments do not have to follow rulings over EU law because of the domestic norm of the rule of law or because governments are incapable of pursuing their interests effectively in a legal setting. Publics do not have to be particularly well informed or interested in what the ECJ is doing or how EU law is being applied. National courts do not have to be responsible for issuing the rulings. All the ECJ needs is to be strategic in its decision-making (i.e. to avoid issuing rulings that governments will overtly ignore where possible), some proportion of its cases to be occasionally discussed in the popular press, and a little bit of luck.
However, just because the EU legal system could become a check does not mean that it will become a check. Not only is there no guarantee that the EU legal system will be an equivalent constraint on all governments, but it is quite possible that public perceptions will never shift to the point where publics are willing to punish governments for noncompliance with court rulings on EU law in any country. Thus, the best the ECJ may be able to hope for is to enforce EU law on a nation-by-nation basis.
Enlargement
How might enlargement affect the ability of the ECJ to act as a democratic constraint on member state governments? This question is best answered in two parts: (1) how might enlargement affect the ability of the ECJ to rule against existing member state governments; and (2) under what conditions should we expect the ECJ to be able to rule against the new entrants?
With regard to the first question, it is unlikely that enlargement will affect how the ECJ rules. The economies of the new entrants are relatively small and underdeveloped compared with most of the EU member states. Thus, the frequency with which the new entrants comply with EU law should have only a nominal effect on the incentive for current members to comply.
With regard to the second question, the ECJ's role for the new entrants should depend entirely upon how the new entrants' publics perceive the role of the EU and the ECJ. If the EU is popular and individuals believe that existing member state governments comply with rulings unconditionally, it is likely that the ECJ will be able to rule against new entrant governments almost immediately. However, if the EU is relatively unpopular and seen as a tool of the existing member states to be used against the new entrants, it is likely that the publics will view noncompliance with adverse rulings as an indication that the domestic government is sticking up for domestic interests in a positive way. Thus, the conditions under which the ECJ will be able to rule against new entrant governments depend entirely upon public perceptions of the accession process.
Conclusion
Most students of democracy agree that there are a number of institutions necessary for a political system to be considered democratic. One of the most important of these institutions is an independent judiciary capable of ensuring that law is applied in some sense consistently and fairly within that judiciary's jurisdiction. The European Court of Justice is supposed to be that body for the European Union, but whether the ECJ really has achieved this status has been the subject of much debate. Scholars have argued over whether the ECJ has created a legally integrated EU in which both private and public actors find themselves constrained to obey EU law, and how such a change might come about in the first place. Using an existing model of endogenous judicial institutions, my analysis has demonstrated that public perceptions of institutional legitimacy are critical to the EU legal system being able to act as an effective democratic check. Further, results show (1) that this legitimacy can arise from publics who are uninterested in and uninformed about what the courts are actually ruling over, and (2) that this transformation can occur with governments fully aware of this possible development and fully capable of stopping it at any time. Thus, although the ECJ remains woefully short on public legitimacy today, this study suggests at least one route through which it may be able to improve its public perception and thereby become a viable, democratic institution in the future.
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1 The Supremacy doctrine declared that, where in conflict, EU law trumps national law, even if the national law is passed after the EU law is in place. The Direct Effect doctrine declared that national courts are responsible for applying EU law directly. Thus, these two doctrines in effect merged the national and EU-level legal regimes and set EU law above national law. 2 The seminal example is the Cassis de Dijon case (1979) in which the ECJ established the precedent for mutual recognition. This ruling declared that any product standard acceptable in one country must be acceptable in the rest. In this particular case, if Cassis could be sold as a liquor in France it must also be marketable as a liquor in Germany. The ECJ claimed that this ruling was simply a logical implication of the mandate for the free movement of goods. However, never before had such an implication been claimed, and there is no question that mutual recognition, particularly when actually codified in the Single European Act, increased economic integration. 3 For example, Germany would not have accepted Cassis as liquor without the court issuing a ruling against the German government. 4 One can reasonably argue that work by Stone Brunell (1998a, 1998b) and Shapiro and Stone (1994) established a third, entirely separate, position on how the ECJ has facilitated integration. However, what distinguishes their argument from other neo-functional work is that, according to their theory, the ECJ has facilitated integration by transforming government preferences over time rather than by ignoring government preferences entirely. Thus, since this article is focused on understanding to what degree the ECJ can rule against governments and get compliance, their work is omitted from the main discussion. 5 An equilibrium in which governments simply are punished for being observed not complying on low costs does not hold because litigants would then never have an incentive to bring a case. All observed defections would be high-cost or false defections, ones that litigants do not win. If litigants did not bring cases, the equilibrium would unravel because governments would not have any incentive to cooperate on low costs. 6 Note that these conclusions rest on the assumption that a selective compliance equilibrium in which there is probabilistic compliance with low costs and no compliance over high costs yields a higher expected utility for governments than does permanent compliance over low costs and probabilistic compliance over high costs. However, this condition must hold for meaningful conflict between the ECJ and the governments over the application of EU law. 7 Litigants are indifferent when the probability of winning a case times the benefit of winning the case equals the probability of losing the case times the cost of bringing a case. Bringing cases more often would not be in equilibrium because governments would then never want to defect on low costs and there would be a contradiction. Bringing cases less often would not be in equilibrium because governments would then always want to defect on low costs and litigants would always want to bring a case and this would be a contradiction.
Governments are indifferent when the probability of a case not being brought times the benefit of not getting caught defecting plus the probability of a case being brought times the cost of being caught equals the cost of just complying in the first place. Not complying on low costs more often would not be in equilibrium because litigants would then always bring cases and governments would always want to comply, and this would be a contradiction. Not complying less often on low costs would not be in equilibrium because litigants would then never want to bring cases and governments would never want to comply, and we have a contradiction. 8 See Vanberg (2001) for a model in which the public acts as an enforcement mechanism of national courts. 9 The probability that makes a government indifferent over high-cost compliance is the one for which the probability of having a case brought times the cost of the adverse judgment equals the cost of complying in the first place, c h . The probability that makes the litigant (court) indifferent over bringing a case is the one for which the probability of the government losing the case and paying the adverse judgment times the benefit of having the government obey the adverse ruling equals the cost of bringing a case. 10 As before, litigants are indifferent when the probability of winning a case times the benefit of winning the case equals the probability of losing the case times the cost of bringing a case. The logic of why behavior is mixes is the same as in the baseline model. Also as before, governments are indifferent when the probability of a case not being brought times the benefit of not getting caught defecting plus the probability of a case being brought times the cost of being caught equals the cost of just complying in the first place. Again, the logic of why behavior is mixes is the same as in the baseline model.
